Stasi / Facebook / Big Data DAAD Day 23 – Automation in Stasi postal surveillance: Work Table for Hot Steam Opening System 532


Credit: Museum in der Runde Ecke

If the “W”-shaped, two-letter steam distribution grid was an “upgrade,” then the ultimate “deluxe” Stasi steam device for manually opening letters with hot water vapor is the “Arbeitstisch der Heißdampf-Öffnungsanlage 532” (English: Work Table for Hot Steam Opening System 532). This modular table was constructed for Department M by the Operational-Technical Sector (OTS) of the MfS in the late 1970’s for manually steaming open envelopes with water-soluble adhesives. The Museum in der Runde Ecke has two of these modified working tables. There is no information on whether “532” is the model number or series number (which would imply there were 531 other models!), and unfortunately I did not record the plate on the front last time in Leipzig, so I cannot confirm its contents until I return.


Credit: Museum in der Runde Ecke

One of the Runde Ecke tables has its own power supply which could be connected to up to three other units to supply power in series (a.k.a. “daisy chaining”). In the center of each table is a “W”-shaped vapor dispersion grid on which two envelopes could be placed. Under the plate is the steam generator, which contained a heater, water storage, and float. While in operation a storage vessel for distilled water was placed underneath. The unit was operated by turning the rotary switch (positions: 0 = “off”, 1 = “pause”, and 2 = “full”) on the attached control panel. Two control lights indicated the operating state of the table, a yellow light which lit when the table was on, and a red light which illuminated when the float inside the steam generator detected that the water was low.


Credit: Museum in der Runde Ecke

To use the table MfS staff turned the steam generator dial to the “full” position. This activated the heater inside the water receptacle. Once the water reached the correct temperature and began to evaporate the staff placed the flap of the letters on the angles of the W-shaped mesh grids. The vapor, which could reach temperatures of to 100ºC, emerged from the W and dissolved the adhesive. A towel was stretched over the opening to prevent water buildup. Up to 100 letters (between private citizens of the GDR) per hour could be opened on this device.


Stasi staff using the “Work Table for Hot Steam Opening System 532.” Credit: BStU, MfS, Dept. M, Fo 0031, figure 0003

Of the devices I’ve examined so far, this table has little outright evidence that it contains modified parts. Unlike the “hacker aesthetic” of other devices, attention has been given to the various additions to the table to match them to the original. The control panels use commercially-available switches and indicators and are constructed with sheet steel and painted to match the bluish grey steel of the tables. The “W” mesh steam dispersion grid appears to be constructed of aluminum or another treated metal that would not oxidize, and is attached to the table using a plate with measured and symmetrical fasteners. Like the Stasi organization itself, which over time refined their methods according their ideology and what was available, the sharp edges and reused parts on this transformed table are concealed to match the professionalism, efficiency, and attention to detail with which the workers were expected to perform their tasks.


Credit: Owen Mundy

  1. Work Table for Hot Steam Opening System 532 (Inventory no. 00007). Objekt- und Fotodatenbank Online im Museum in der Runden Ecke. Accessed June 10, 2017.
  2. Work Table for Hot Steam Opening System 532 (Inventory no. 00354). Objekt- und Fotodatenbank Online im Museum in der Runden Ecke. Accessed June 10, 2017.
  3. BStU. Die Stasi und das Postgeheimnis. Accessed June 10, 2017.

Stasi / Facebook / Big Data DAAD Day 22 – Automation in Stasi postal surveillance: Aufdampftopf


Credit: Museum in der Runde Ecke

Like other devices constructed in the 1970’s and ‘80s by Department M and the Stasi OTS, this “Aufdampftopf” (“steam pot”) was fashioned using a basic household appliance as a starting point. Starting with a “cooking pot,” as it’s called in the Museum in der Runde Ecke index, the vessel was altered with a tight lid so it could be used to heat water (added via the attached funnel) and generate, collect, and disperse steam for opening letters.

The “W” shape of the vapor dispersing grid on top corresponds to the adhesive edges of, not one, but two envelopes placed end to end on the mesh. Presumably an administrator or other coworker made a human mechanical observation in the spirit of efficiency, suggesting that if the grid was expanded then workers could open two envelopes at once.

Like the Kleindampfentwickler with vapor dispersion grid on its top, the Dampfentwickler made from a steam pot also uses copper tubes and plating in its construction. Likewise, the steam pot additions exhibit a DIY aesthetic that contrasts with the mass produced original object. The copper, again chosen for its malleability and capacity to withstand water, shows signs of use in its darkening patina. It gives the steam pot the appearance of a prop for a dystopian science fiction film, or at least a reference to a real thing, inspiring one to think of a steampunk look popular among cosplayers.


Credit: Museum in der Runde Ecke

The Stasi’s practice of taking bits and pieces from whatever was available might have been based on scarcity given the economic constraints in communist GDR, but their hacked outcomes have a specific “remix aesthetic,” to borrow the term Eduardo Navas uses in his book Remix Theory: The Aesthetics of Sampling. Specifically, the Stasi’s reuse and appropriation of objects and materials towards utilitarian ends expresses itself in the same way the “sampling” of a DJ or musician might. Given the motivations for, uses of, and choices in construction of this device—to secretly open personal communications between individuals and examine their contents (which of course happens on the part of governments and corporations nowadays)—an art historian or anthropologist might term this a classic example of “early hacker”.

  1. Steam generator for opening letters (Inventory no. 00042). Objekt- und Fotodatenbank Online im Museum in der Runden Ecke. Accessed June 10, 2017.

Stasi / Facebook / Big Data DAAD Day 21 – Automation in Stasi postal surveillance: Kleindampfentwickler with nozzle

The Museum in der Runde Ecke in Leipzig has an amazing collection of devices found in the Leipziger district administration office (BVfS) during the dissolution of the Stasi. These are listed online in a thorough index with photos and descriptions. Their images are much better than those I was able to make through the glass of their museum displays, and while I’ve contacted the Citizen’s Committee about making new ones, they hopefully won’t mind if I reproduce some of them here in the meantime.


Credit: Museum in der Runde Ecke

This steam generator was used, like the Kleindampfentwickler in my previous post, for opening “suspicious” letters. The Stasi Department M works directed the steam from the nozzle at the envelope to loosen the water-soluble glue on the flap. Like the Kleindampfentwickler, it was originally a mass-produced device (the Runde Ecke description states it was originally a medical inhaler). It has a glass tube indicating water level, and was stored in a case containing other working materials (which were not preserved) such as “ether, distilled water, glue, knife, scissors, brushes, adhesive strips and cleaning cloths.”

  1. Steam generator for opening letters (Inventory no. 00031). Objekt- und Fotodatenbank Online im Museum in der Runden Ecke. Accessed June 10, 2017.

Stasi / Facebook / Big Data DAAD Day 20 – Automation in Stasi postal surveillance: Kleindampfentwickler

Department M, along with the Stasi OTS (Operativ-Technische Sektor), developed and implemented numerous technical tools, intelligence checks, and operational activities to speed their postal surveillance in the GDR. By the 1970’s, the department was already using various modified household appliances or industrial devices to assist in steaming open and closing letters. One example is this “Kleindampfentwickler”—a “small steam generator,” which appears to be a modified espresso maker or water boiler, with an added, V-shaped steam outlet.


The Kleindampfentwickler (Credit: BStU)

The materials and intentional flat and curved lines in the design of the chrome base and plastic handle suggest it was mass produced. The Stasi probably chose the kettle for the wide base and low placement of the electrical connection which serve to keep the center of gravity low and prevent tipping. They used a V-shape for this and other steam outlets to match the angled shape of envelope flaps. This one is designed to loosen the glue on a single envelope, while other steam outlets could accommodate more.

The crude construction of the modified steam outlet sharply contrasts with the retail-ready kettle. The choice of soldered copper for the material of the pipe leading upwards and steam outlet were probably based on what was available, water resistant, and easy to work with. Copper is used for speciality roofs and gutters, with the seams joined together using heat and solder. The joinery on the Stasi’s addition is not pretty, making it stand out against the base, but it exemplifies the experimental methodologies of the engineers who worked behind closed doors, as well as the belief the aesthetics or secrecy of their work would never be scrutinized.


The Kleindampfentwickler Operational Carrying Case (Credit: BStU)

Stasi / Facebook / Big Data DAAD Day 19 – Automation in Stasi postal surveillance: The PiD Trap

In the beginning of the 1970s most of the work of Department M was performed by hand. This labor included sorting and selecting suspicious mail, manually steaming it open, examining the contents, transcribing, copying or photographing the interior or exterior of the letter, in some cases, examining the letter for conspiratorial or stealth writing, resealing the envelope, and placing the letter back into circulation at Deutsche Post. As the secret operations heightened the suspicions during the Cold War, and with the postal service increasingly relied upon for cross-border communications thanks to the Berlin Wall preventing face to face meetings, Department M received more pressure to increase their efficiency through mechanical means.

One such machine used by the Stasi was referred to as the “PiD Trap.” This electronic device automatically scanned and screened regular letters from printed materials like newspaper excerpts, church letters, and advertisements. Like the organizational systems the Stasi employed, this apparatus made it possible to divide and focus the labor of their workers and expedited the sorting and determination of suspicious mail and “negative” or “hostile” influences from the west in the form of Politisch-ideologische Diversion (PiD). (Labrenz-Weiß, 28)

  1. Hanna Labrenz-Weiß, Abteilung M (MfS Handbuch). Hg. BStU. Berlin 2005.

Stasi / Facebook / Big Data DAAD Day 17 – Stasi networks and Facebook Social Graph

Similar to how Facebook uses a user’s connections to determine information about them, the Stasi considered all information they could gather about a person in their intelligence campaigns. They incorporated not only the contents of a target’s mail, but information about professional and personal relationships, love affairs, and organizations to which they belonged. (Reinicke, 106)


Source: ProPublica/BStU

This attention to not only the contents of a person’s postal communications, but their social connections can be evidenced in this hand-made graphic discovered at the BStU by Julia Angwin. The graphic shows forty-six connections, linking a targeted citizen to other potentially interesting persons (e.g. an aunt), places (e.g. “church”), and meetings (e.g. post, phone). Through whichever means necessary the Stasi made and utilized these connections in order to gain additional insights and institute methods of control.


Visual explanation of Facebook Social Graph. Source: Business Insider

This image reinforces the notion that the Stasi’s work was mostly a manual, often experimental, labor. It also tells us their work in surveillance and control, which is seen as a miserable, tyrannical sort, is now standard business practice among the software-automated surveillance capitalist models of the internet used by Facebook, Google, and others. Just as Department M workers like Gerd Reinicke mined the post for intelligence and PiD, the same basic processes the Stasi developed, now used as software by Facebook, are also at work in China, Iran, and other countries to filter and control what people can say and read through elaborate censorship software systems.

  1. Hanna Labrenz-Weiß. Abteilung M (MfS Handbuch). Hg. BStU. Berlin 2005.
  2. Reinicke, Gerd. “Mitlesen für den Klassenkampf: Postkontrolle der Stasi”. In: Heimliche Leser in der DDR: Kontrolle und Verbreitung unerlaubter Literatur (ed. Siegfried Lokatis). Berlin, 2008.
  3. Angwin, J. (2017). You Know Who Else Collected Metadata ? The Stasi. ProPublica, 6–8.

Stasi / Facebook / Big Data DAAD Day 16 – Notes from a former Department M surveillance operator (part2)

During the seven years Gerd Reinicke worked for Department M the scope of surveillance grew steadily. This is particularly evident in the 1980s, when as the government became more and more concerned of the “class struggle,” they dramatically increased the number of operators in Department M, more than doubling the size from 1980 to 1989.


Stasi Dept. M – Total employees (data from Abteilung M (MfS Handbuch). Hg. BStU. Berlin 2005.)

Reinicke and his coworkers in the “Evaluation and Information” unit constantly tried to increase the “Trefferquote” or “hit rate” of material worthy of confiscation by memorizing large numbers of postal codes, names, and handwriting. Their shift managers carefully sampled the work of individual employees, checking for missed letters, which could result in punishment and disciplinary measures.

Once a citizen or group had been classified as “operationally interesting” then all their mail was withheld for inspection. Citizens of the GDR who sent private messages critical of the government or its leaders through the mail first, had their mail confiscated, and second could be brought to court on charges of “anti-state agitation” according to Section 106 of the Criminal Code of the GDR. (Reinicke, 105)

  1. Reinicke, Gerd. “Mitlesen für den Klassenkampf: Postkontrolle der Stasi”. In: Heimliche Leser in der DDR: Kontrolle und Verbreitung unerlaubter Literatur (ed. Siegfried Lokatis). Berlin, 2008.

Stasi / Facebook / Big Data DAAD Day 15 – Notes from a former Department M surveillance operator

In the essay, “Eavesdropping for the class struggle: Postal control of the Stasi,” from the book, “Secret readers in the GDR: Control and distribution of illicit literature” (ed. Siegfried Lokatis), Gerd Reinicke describes his work in the “evaluation and information” section of the Stasi’s Department M. He explains his job was to assess and classify the contents of mailings, personal letters and printed materials, and in extreme cases, make decisions about confiscation.

This work was not easy. The stream of mail was constant and so he had a limited time frame for his work. He operated in secret, but also had to consider the public perception of his decisions. While technically illegal, the government watched all mail moving within the country, as well as that leaving or arriving in the GDR. As far as the population was concerned it was an “open secret,” because they observed the effect of the government’s policy of opening mail to remove valuable items, as well any writing or media considered to be “Politisch-ideologische Diversion (PiD)” (English: “Political-ideological Diversion”)—a task which was not as clear as it might seem.

Upon his hire was told to collect information on people and facts that might be “operatively interesting” to intelligence services. But he also received instructions to remove “anything unnecessary.” This work reflects the dual role that Department M played for the SED as a surveillance and control mechanism. On one hand, they watched for communications between spies or dissidents, but they were often a censorship apparatus.

This flowchart shows the three basic categories by which mail was classified, and subclassified, specifically, as “messages suspicious of being intelligence communications,” “messages suspicious of being PiD,” and “messages determined to be ‘interesting content’.” The assignment into of any of these categories determined further routing into the Department M machinery.


Heimliche Leser in der DDR: Kontrolle und Verbreitung unerlaubter Literatur (ed. Siegfried Lokatis)

These broad definitions also underline the ambiguity in how their surveillance and censorship was officially applied. For example, in dealing with Western and dissident literature, these instructions were followed in different ways. Sometimes operators were generous in their interpretation of “class struggle appropriate” materials, while other times he characterizes their subjective interpretation as “petty.”

  • Hanna Labrenz-Weiß. Abteilung M (MfS Handbuch). Hg. BStU. Berlin 2005.
  • Reinicke, Gerd. “Mitlesen für den Klassenkampf: Postkontrolle der Stasi”. In: Heimliche Leser in der DDR: Kontrolle und Verbreitung unerlaubter Literatur (ed. Siegfried Lokatis). Berlin, 2008.
  • Stasi / Facebook / Big Data DAAD Day 14 – Department M OibE groups

    Thanks to the implementation of index cards across the MfS, Department M had access to sender and receiver addresses, contacts, relatives, etc. to inform their surveillance work. By 1970, the department had instituted the following operational steps for examining mail. Numbers 3–6 were considered highly secretive and operations were performed under the codename “Eagle Flight”.

    1. Check if the sender or recipient existed in the police card index
    2. Establish an “Operational Comparison Card” to record information found in the mailing
    3. In the case of a suspicious mailing, carry out a search of the mail box
    4. Create photographic documentation of letterheads
    5. Compare the handwriting or typewriting font, spelling, etc. of the letter head. Identify any stealth writing.
    6. Form a special “OibE” group to check mail boxes.

    Offizieren im besonderen Einsatz (OibE) (English: Officers in Special Operations) groups were formed specifically to monitor, and in some cases, empty mailboxes under the cover of the Deutsche Post uniforms and vehicles. They photographed persons of interest as they dropped mail off, and then opened the mail boxes and examined the contents of letters before they even reached the post office. Photographic records of their work exist, and were presented in the exhibition, “Ein offenes Geheimnis. Post- und Telefonkontrolle in der DDR” (English: “An open secret. Postal and telephone control in the GDR”) (Labrenz-Weiß, 22–24)


    Source: BStU

    1. Hanna Labrenz-Weiß, Abteilung M (MfS Handbuch). Hg. BStU. Berlin 2005.